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Devolution dynamics of Spanish local government
Abstract
Over the last few years, there has been a devolutionary tendency in many devel-
oped and developing countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose
whether the benefits in terms of efficiency derived from transfers of powers from higher
to municipal levels of government (the “economic dividend” of devolution) might increase
over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approaches for efficiency
measurement. We provide an application to Spanish municipalities, which have had to
adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to domestic regulation
seeking local governments’ balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency gains from
enhanced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which
these gains accrue differs across municipalities—in some cases technical change is the
main component, whereas in others catching up dominates.
2
1. Introduction
The literature on the economic dividend of devolution, i.e., the transfer of powers from higher
to lower levels of government, has been growing over the last few years. Many factors have
prompted its blooming, among which we may highlight three. First, in the case of developed
countries, the guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism have prompted its analysis as
a central policy issue both in the United States and several European Union countries (Inman
and Rubinfeld, 1997, 1998). Second, in the developing world it is at the center of reform
efforts not only throughout Latin America and many parts of Asia and Africa but also in
several formerly planned economies (Stewart, 2000). Last, but not least, analyzing the links
between decentralization and efficiency has been always at the core of public economics, and
it provides the rationale as to which benefits could arise from decentralizing in developing
countries. As recognized by many studies since Tiebout’s classic essay (1956), a literature has
developed that emphasizes the benefits of political decentralization and the competition that
it fosters among regional or local governments (Cai and Treisman, 2004).
The literature analyzing the economic dividend of devolution in local government enumer-
ates several advantages, although some downsides also exist. The early contributions date
back to the pioneering studies by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), but given the acceleration
of the global trend towards devolution that has occurred over the last thirty years some recent
studies have reassessed its costs and benefits.1 On the positive hand, we may highlight that
the devolved administrations’ ability to tailor policies to local needs generate innovation in
service provision through inter-territorial competition, as well as stimulates participation and
accountability by reducing the distance between those in government and their constituencies
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). From the economic costs’ point of view, devolved govern-
mental systems may have some negative economic implications in terms of efficiency and
equity, along with the imposition of significant institutional burdens.
One of the most significant economic benefits that devolution may bring about is munici-
palities’ productive efficiency. As indicated by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), some of the
proponents of decentralization attribute their support for a greater transfer of powers towards
subnational tiers of government to their negative perception of the capacity of central gov-
ernments to deliver public services efficiently (Klugman, 1994). This positive effect may work
through a variety of mechanisms. One of them relates to citizen mobility, which eventually
1See, for instance, the studies by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), Keating (1998), Klugman (1994), Xie
et al. (1999), or Zhang and Zou (1998), among others.
3
ensures a perfect match between taxpayers’ demands and municipalities’ supply, thus guar-
anteeing an efficient delivery of public services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). Interterritorial
competition at local and regional level may also have a significant part to play, since it forces
governments to concentrate on the efficient provision of public goods and services (Tiebout,
1956; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Another mechanism operates through the advantages
that smaller jurisdictions have to tailor their policies to the specific preferences of their pop-
ulations. Indeed, as one may derive from Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, the larger
the variance in taste, the larger are the potential benefits of decentralization. There are also
some arguments which operate from a political perspective. For instance, if local governments
have greater proximity to their constituencies, this allows them greater flexibility to respond
to local needs and preferences, and therefore efficiently match the provision of public services
to local demand. This proximity to the “people” also widens the scope for greater political
and accountability transparency. In addition, not only does it reduce bureaucratic complexity
and increases citizens’ monitoring capacity, but it stimulates further efficiency gains as elected
representatives are obliged to be more sensitive to the preferences of their constituencies.
However, there are limits to the economic benefits of devolution. Some authors even point
towards the “dangers” of transfers of powers to lower levels of government (Prud’homme,
1995). The main argument is that national provision of public goods and services may be
more efficient than at regional and local level. This would occur under certain circumstances
such as when economies of scale and scope exist, and/or there are difficulties in assigning
powers in a non-overlapping way. A further example is where corruption may emerge more
easily at regional and local level, and/or regional governments operate in conditions of “soft
budget constraints”. It should also be pointed out that the devolution of powers to subna-
tional governments might increase spatial disparities, since the power of central government to
curb inequalities is reduced (Prud’homme, 1995). This point has also been forcefully made by
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005), who argue that Peterson’s (1981) balance between a redistrib-
utive central or federal state and distributive and regulatory local and regional governments
can be perturbed by devolution. However, the magnitude of this limit is partly subjective,
given that it hinges on the value each nation attaches to reducing inequality among its citizens.
Most of the literature, regardless of the particular vision on whether the links between
efficiency and devolution are positive or negative, stresses that more empirical work is needed
(Prud’homme, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Until relatively recently, the exist-
ing studies which analyzed the question from this empirical perspective were “surprisingly
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few” (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). This claim was recently stressed by Rodríguez-Pose
et al. (2009) who, following Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), indicate that “although the
notion that decentralisation increases government efficiency seems widely accepted amongst
governments and international organisations alike, the empirical proof for this proposition
remains scant” (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009, p.2041).
Most of the existing empirical studies are country-specific, although severals cross-country
comparisons have also been published (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Xie
et al., 1999). Some of the early empirical studies report positive links between devolution
and efficiency (Akai and Sakata, 2002; Zhang and Zou, 2001). In other cases, relationships
have been found to be weak (Rodríguez-Pose, 1996). The number of empirical studies on the
issue has increased sharply in recent times (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007, see, for instance),
although most of the papers are more focused on how devolution affects growth; see, for
instance, Lin and Liu (2000), Thießen (2003), Iimi (2005), Thornton (2007) or, more recently,
Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009). Rodríguez-Pose et al.’s (2009) is particularly interesting in
some regards, since it provides a cross-country comparison for five developed and developing
countries (Germany, India, Mexico, Spain, and the USA) where decentralization initiatives
have differed greatly. Calamai (2009) also discusses issues related to decentralization and
growth (in particular, they study the link between devolution and regional disparities in Italy),
whereas other recent papers such as Silva-Ochoa (2009) deal with related topics (institutions
and the provision of local services) in the case of Mexico. Therefore, the literature is rapidly
bridging the gap on the lack of empirical studies, with the links between decentralization and
efficiency being explored from several perspectives.
In this paper we provide some methods to analyze the benefits of enhanced devolution in
terms of local governments’ efficiency from a dynamic perspective. In order to do this, we
present a methodology whose underpinnings are derived from the literature on the analysis of
efficiency and productivity using linear programming methods. Specifically, our methods are
directly derived from the (deterministic) frontier production function literature, based on the
pioneering work of Farrell (1957), and Afriat (1972) and nicely exposited in Färe et al. (1994),
combining them with the recent contribution to evaluate jointly efficiency and devolution by
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009). We propose an indicator to measure whether municipalities can
benefit over time from a hypothetical transfer of powers from higher levels of government, in
such a way that small municipalities (under 1,000 inhabitants) would provide similar services
to large ones. Our goal is to analyze whether these hypothetical efficiency gains—the economic
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dividend of devolution—increased from year 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005, and to
decompose the gains over time in two components in a similar fashion to the Malmquist
productivity index (Caves et al., 1982).
We analyze this question in the context of Spanish local government. Several reasons sup-
port this application. First, since the passing of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, there has
been a relentless process of devolving powers from national to regional levels of government.
As indicated by Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009), regional pressures, especially those by nation-
alist forces in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, are largely
responsible for this recent devolution of powers to lower levels of government (Núñez, 2001).
In this scenario, the devolutionary process was perceived as a transcendent step for both con-
solidating democracy and creating a more widely accepted form of governance Rodríguez-Pose
(1996). Indeed, as indicated by (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009), devolution is also especially
important in Spain from a point of view of increasing stability and public trust in government
after the death of General Franco, contributing to the strengthening of democratic princi-
ples (Núñez, 2001). The magnitude of this devolutionary process has led to a remarkable
increase in subnational expenditures (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009). Specifically, the increase
of transfers to subnational governments reflects their enhanced control over functions and
resources. However, the “hypothetical” second devolution, from regional to local levels of
government, never actually took place, at least compared to the magnitude of the devolution
to the regional level. Therefore, one might naturally wonder why it did not occur and, if it
did, what its economic dividend would be. Second, Spanish municipalities have faced tighter
budget constraints since the passing of the law on budget stability in 2001 (“Ley General de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria”), which establishes mechanisms to control public debt and pub-
lic spending seeking the objective of a balanced budget. This law shares the spirit of the
European Stability and Growth Pact and therefore some of our arguments could be valid—
under certain circumstances—for other euro area countries, where budgetary constraints also
tightened up significantly to meet the criteria to join the euro. One might naturally inquire
how these changes might have affected different aspects of Spanish municipalities, especially
in terms of efficiency and its temporal evolution. Finally, the data on Spanish municipalities
is quite rich. It is therefore interesting per se to exploit the database to analyze a variety of
local governments’ issues, given that its richness is generally absent in other studies on local
government.
In addition, compared to other European countries, analyzing devolution in the Spanish
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case is also important because of the impact of the recent economic and financial crises on
Spanish public sector deficit—which as of September, 2009, is roughly 6% of the GDP, whereas
in 2007 there was a surplus. Compared to other European countries the scenario is gloomier
with forecasts indicating it will take longer for the Spanish economy to surge again. In this
difficult scenario, the relevance of the study on efficiency and related issues in the public sector
gains momentum.
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, Sections 2 provides the meth-
ods used. Section 3 presents the data on inputs and outputs, while Section 4 shows the results.
Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Methods
Our methods are based on the seminal ideas of Charnes et al. (1978), who developed Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the technical efficiency of production. One of the
main advantages of these methods is their absence of rigid assumptions. However, an even
more flexible approach is Free Disposable Hull (FDH) in which the convexity assumption on
the technology is dropped (Deprins et al., 1984). Our study uses this approach for both its
higher flexibility and superior asymptotic properties (Park et al., 2000).
We can also use some graphical examples to better realize the advantages of using FDH
as opposed to DEA. Figure 1 depicts a scenario for five municipalities (A, B, C, D and E).
For simplicity reasons, we assume that only one output y is produced (which is represented
in the horizontal axis) while the vertical axis represents total costs (TC). In this example,
irrespective of the convexity assumption, units A, B, C and D appear as efficient in their
respective scale (say, they are efficient in the variable returns to scale, VRS, technology),
while municipality E is inefficient, since it is possible to find a less costly way to produce the
output level production yE. The standard (convex) VRS cost efficiency model will show that
it is possible to produce yE with a lower total cost than the observed cost for municipality E
(αDEA× TCE < TCE). The cost efficiency coefficient αDEA will show a value lower than the
unity, indicating the percentage of the observed cost to reach the convex frontier.
In Figure 1 it is assumed than municipalities A and B are operating in a centralized
environment (which we label S1), while municipalities C, D and E are operating in a de-
centralized environment (which we label S2). In these specific circumstances, the convexity
assumption causes a problem because the point of the convex cost frontier to evaluate unit
E requires a combination of units B and C which could be unfeasible because they are sit-
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uated in different operating frameworks. Under these circumstances, the application of the
non-convex (FDH) cost frontier offers a less controversial combination: unit E is inefficient
because its total costs to produce yE are higher than αFDH × TCE, a cost reference taken
from the existence of unit C. In this simple example, it is worth mentioning that part of the
cost excess [(αFDH − αDEA)× TCE] hinges exclusively on the convexity assumption.
In a previous study Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) present a methodology to compare central-
ized (municipalities with less powers) and decentralized municipalities (with more powers).
The main interest of their proposal was to enable comparison of decentralized municipalities
with two reference points on the frontier, namely, one from the decentralized sub-sample (S2)
of municipalities and the other from the centralized sub-sample (S1).2 Figure 2 depicts a
hypothetical scenario where decentralized municipalities are more efficient than centralized
when evaluating unit E. As can be seen, the total cost of cloning the centralized municipality
A three times produces the output level yE with a cost frontier γ × TCE higher than the
cost frontier coming from the frontier defined by the decentralized municipalities (β×TCE) .
Summing up, Figure 2 shows the scenario where decentralization economies dominate; under
these circumstances, the ratio between the cost efficiency coefficients (γ/β) will be higher
than the unity.
However, nothing is granted in advance, as the opposite situation could also prevail. In
Figure 3 we can see how the point on the frontier obtained by duplicating municipality A
can produce yE with smaller total costs than the frontier defined by the decentralized mu-
nicipalities (γ × TCE < β × TCE). In this specific case, Figure 3 represents an example
where centralized municipalities are operating with a better level of efficiency with respect to
the decentralized municipalities. In this circumstance, the ratio between the cost efficiency
coefficients (γ/β) will be smaller than the unity.
2.1. Temporal analysis
The evaluation process represented in figures 1–3 has been developed in a previous article
(Balaguer-Coll et al., 2009). We now present a natural extension introducing movements
over time of the frontiers corresponding to both centralized and decentralized municipalities.
Therefore, the question to answer is now different, since the objective is to ascertain to what
extent differences in cost efficiency among centralized and decentralized municipalities are
expanded or contracted between two periods t and t+ 1. In other words, while in Balaguer-
2Here we will only present the graphical illustration to offer an intuitive idea about their proposal. Programs
[7] and [8] in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) define the mathematical programs that quantify coefficients β and γ.
8
Coll et al. (2009) a static picture is presented, we now focus on sequence of movements, which
is more complex as changes in time can be generated by a variety of causes.
Let us therefore assume that we have data corresponding to two time periods (t and t+1)
for the two sub-samples of municipalities (those operating in a centralized environment, S1,
and those others operating in a decentralized system, S2). It is feasible to define an index
evaluating the time evolution of the coefficients presented earlier as follows:
γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1
γs2,t/βs2,t
=
γs2,t+1/γs2,t
βs2,t+1/βs2,t
(1)
whose value will be above (below) unity when decentralization economies increase (decrease)
between periods t and t+ 1, respectively. If nothing changes, the index equals unity.
This temporal index can be decomposed analogously to the Malmquist indices (see Caves
et al., 1982; Grosskopf, 2003). In doing so, we determine the importance of technical change
(frontier shifts between t and t+1), and efficiency change (considering the movements in the
distance separating the observation analyzed from their respective frontiers).
Allowing for this decomposition involves defining two integer programming problems which
combine information corresponding to periods t and t+ 1:
OE(ys2,t+1) = min
β˜,λ,z
β˜s2,t+1
s.t. β˜s2,t+1TCs2,t+1 −TCs2,tλ ≥ 0,
−ys2,t+1 +Ms2,tλ ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
−→
1 z = 1,
z = {0, 1},
λ = integer,
(2)
and
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OEs2(ys2,t+1) = min
γ˜,λ,z
γ˜s2,t+1
s.t. γ˜s2,t+1TCs2,t+1 −TCs1,tλ ≥ 0,
−ys2,t+1 +Ms1,tλ ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
−→
1 z = 1,
z = {0, 1},
λ = integer.
(3)
where y, TC , β and γ have been already defined and λ is an activity integer vector denoting
the intensity levels at which the benchmark observation is conducted;M is a matrix containing
the observed output vectors for the centralized (MS1) and decentralized (MS2) municipalities;
z is an activity integer vector having a value equal to one when referring to the unit taken as
a benchmark and having a null value otherwise; and B is a scalar with a large absolute value.
Having obtained these new cost efficiency coefficients, it is a straightforward process to
decompose the index in order to define the technical change and efficiency change components:
γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1
γs2,t/βs2,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Decentralization economies index
=
γs2,t+1/γ˜s2,t+1
βs2,t+1/β˜s2,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Technical change index (tc)
×
γ˜s2,t+1/γs2,t
β˜s2,t+1/βs2,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Efficiency change index (ec)
(4)
The technical change index (tc) quantifies the observed movements on the frontier of
more decentralized municipalities with respect to the change in the frontier made up of less
decentralized ones. This index encompasses the relative shifts in best-practice technology,
corresponding to the two samples (S1 and S2) under analysis, between periods t and t + 1.
A technical change index larger than unity indicates that the best practice frontier of sub-
sample S2 improves more rapidly than that corresponding to sub-sample S1 (i.e., decentralized
municipalities go through faster technical progress). When the technical change index is below
unity, then the technical progress of the S1 sub-sample is higher than the technical progress
corresponding to the sub-sample S2 (i.e., less decentralized municipalities experience faster
technical progress).
One empirical example sheds light on the interpretation of this component. If decen-
tralization provides flexibility, and flexibility favors the capacity to innovate in order to do
things better over time, then the technical change index is above unity when decentralized
municipalities demonstrate to having introduced innovations better than non decentralized
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municipalities have.
In contrast, the efficiency change index (or catching up effect, ec), shows what the changes
in the relative cost efficiency levels are, corresponding to the two samples—S1 and S2—under
analysis, between periods t and t+1. This index defines the distance of the observed costs for
periods t and t+ 1 with respect to the frontier in period t. It indicates whether observations
in t + 1 are closer to the frontier than they are in period t. When the efficiency change
index is larger than unity, the cost efficiency change between periods t and t+1 shows greater
improvement for S2 (decentralized) sub-sample than for the S1 (less decentralized) sub-sample.
On the other hand, when the efficiency change index is below unity, the distance with respect
to the frontier of the sub-sample S1 (less decentralized) increases more than the distance with
respect to sub-sample S2 (decentralized).
Following the example of decentralization as a way to introduce flexibility, the efficiency
change index is above unity when decentralized municipalities which take advantage of their
flexibility are able to emulate the best performers faster than non flexible municipalities. In
other words, non decentralized municipalities face a kind of barrier to mobility that limits
their capacity to adopt innovations.
As suggested by Worthington and Dollery (2000), this distinction is important from a
policy viewpoint, since the changes in productivity growth due to inefficiency demand different
policies from those concerning technical change (see Grosskopf, 1993). As Worthington and
Dollery (2000) indicate sluggish productivity due to a poor efficiency change index would
require policies designed to foster innovations. In contrast, policies designed to innovate
would exert its impact on the technical change index.
2.2. Bipartite decomposition of the factors affecting the decentralization economies
index
We now turn to an analysis of the distribution dynamics of the decentralization economies
index, which is generally more informative than summary statistics such as the conditional
mean of variance, especially when multi-modality is present. Our objective is to assess the
degree to which each of the three components of productivity change account for deforming the
distribution of the decentralization index between 1995 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2005,
in a similar fashion as Kumar and Russell (2002). We carry out the analysis by considering
nonparametric kernel-based density estimates of our decentralization indices.
By rearranging terms in Equation (4) we obtain an expression which provides us with
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information for period t+ 1 level of decentralization economies:
(γs2/βs2)t+1 = tc× ec× (γs2/βs2)t (5)
where tc = (γs2,t+1/γ˜s2,t+1)/(βs2,t+1/β˜s2,t+1) are the changes in decentralization economies
due to technological change (technical change index), ec = (γ˜s2,t+1/γs2,t)/(β˜s2,t+1/βs2,t) rep-
resents the changes in decentralization economies due to efficiency change (efficiency change
index), and (γs2/βs2)t represents the decentralization index in period t. Consequently, both
tc and ec impact on the advance of γs2/βs2 . Both the effect of tc and ec can be measured.
The distribution of the decentralization economies index in period t+1 can consequently
be constructed by successively multiplying the decentralization economies index in period t
by each of the two factors, i.e., technical change and efficiency change. This in turn allows us
to construct counterfactual distributions by sequential introduction of each factor.
The counterfactual t+ 1 period decentralization economies index distribution of the vari-
able
(γs2/βs2)TECH = tc× (γs2/βs2)t (6)
isolates the effect on the distribution of changes in technology only, assuming that efficiency
change is irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (γs2/βs2)t to (γs2/βs2)t+1 would be induced by
changes in technology.
The counterfactual t+ 1 period decentralization economies index distribution of the vari-
able
(γs2/βs2)EFF = ec× (γs2/βs2)t (7)
isolates the effect on the distribution of γs2/βs2 of changes in efficiency only, as if technical
change were irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (γs2/βs2)t to (γs2/βs2)t+1 would be induced
by changes in efficiency only.
As indicated above, this analysis is performed using kernel smoothing methods. The
literature on this topic is voluminous, and several monographs provide appropriate in-depth
analysis (see, for instance, Silverman, 1986). The recent monograph by Li and Racine (2007)
is a nice compendium of previous studies, with new additional contributions.
The general kernel estimator is the Rosenblatt (1956)-Parzen (1962) kernel estimator,
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whose expression is:
fˆ(x) = (Sh)−1
S∑
s=1
K
(xs − x
h
)
= (Sh)−1
S∑
s=1
K(ψs) (8)
where fˆ is the estimated density, x is the evaluation point, xs is the observation being evalu-
ated (s = 1, . . . , S) and h is the bandwidth.
When estimating a density function via kernel smoothing methods, two critical decisions
must be made: (i) choosing the kernel; (ii) choosing the bandwidth. Both affect the shape of
the density, but the effect of the second decision is much larger compared with the first one and,
consequently, the literature devoted to the selection of bandwidth is vast. Regarding the choice
of kernel, several alternatives are available. The features of a kernel are those of a density
function, and thus, kernels are frequently chosen to be well-known density functions (Pagan
and Ullah, 1999), for example the standard normal K(ψ) = (2pi)−1/2exp(−.5ψ2), which was
our choice. Regarding the bandwidth, we have considered plug-in methods (Sheather and
Jones, 1991) because of their superior performance in terms of balance between bias and
variance compared with other methods.
We can also look at nonparametric techniques to formally test whether the distributions
obtained in previous sections differ statistically. Specifically, we apply the Li (1996) test,
which analyzes whether two unknown distributions differ significantly. Therefore, if f and g
are the distributions corresponding to, let us say, γs2,t/βs2,t and γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1, the testable
null hypothesis would be H0 : γs2,t/βs2,t = γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1 against the alternative, H1 :
γs2,t/βs2,t &= γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1.3
The test we use is based on the generally accepted idea of measuring the global distance
(closeness) between two densities f(x) and g(x) by the integrated squared error (Pagan and
Ullah, 1999). The integrated square error is the basis for constructing the statistic on which
the test is based (see Fan, 1994; Li, 1996; Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The Li (1996) test
requires some assumptions to be met such as independently distributed observations in each
sub-group, and identically within each sub-group. However, our estimates are dependent
in the statistical sense, since they have been obtained using linear programming methods.
Therefore, perturbations of observations which lie on the estimated frontier will generally
affect the efficiencies estimated for other observations. Under these circumstances it is not
clear whether the Li (1996) test will perform satisfactorily. Accordingly, we follow Li (1999),
3Some additional refinements to this test have been recently proposed; see, for instance Li et al. (2009).
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who shows that the bootstrap provides better inference than the standard normal. Simar
and Zelenyuk (2006) stress this point, indicating that in the specific setup of efficiency scores
obtained using linear programming techniques there is no real alternative to the bootstrap.
Therefore, we adopt Simar and Zelenyuk’s (2006) proposal based on the bootstrap for adapting
the Li (1996) test to the context of estimates obtained using linear programming methods.
Specifically, consistent bootstrap estimates of the p-values of the Li (1996) test in its own
specific context are provided by:
pˆ =
1
B
B∑
b=1
I{Jˆb > Jˆ}, (9)
where b = 1, . . . , B is the number of bootstrap replicates, I is an indicator function, Jˆ is the
statistic yielded by the Li (1996) test, and Jˆb is the bootstrapped statistic. These p-values
must be adapted to our context—where the true decentralization indices are replaced by our
estimates from equations (2) and (3).
3. Data, inputs, and outputs
We use a sample of 1,164 Spanish municipalities with a population over 1,000 for years 1995,
2000 and 2005. Although the total number of municipalities in the database was higher, the
final number of observations is lower because we consider only municipalities with available
information for all sample years. Both input and output data are provided by the Spanish
Ministry for Public Administration. The analysis is performed for 1995, 2000 and 2005 because
the survey on local infrastructures and facilities (Encuesta de Infraestructuras y Equipamien-
tos Locales), which provides information on outputs, is only available for those years. Input
data has been constructed from local government budget information.
The selection of outputs is based on the services and facilities provided by each municipal-
ity. Spanish local governments must provide minimum services depending on their number of
inhabitants. Some of them are universally provided, yet others are only a legal requirement
for larger municipalities. These categories are municipalities with: (i) less than 5,000 inhabi-
tants; (ii) of over 5,000 and less than 20,000; (iii) of more than 20,000 and less than 50,000;
(iv) and over 50,000. Our outputs have been selected according to the list of minimum ser-
vices.4 They include population (Y1), number of lighting points (Y2), tons of waste collected
4See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the minimum services that each category of
municipalities must provide, and the output indicators designed to measure the different services.
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(Y3), street infrastructure (Y4), public buildings (Y5), market (Y6), public parks (Y7), and
assistance centers (Y8). Outputs Y4 through Y8 are measured via their surface area, in square
meters. We thus measure eight services by means of the proxy indicators. Using proxies is
unavoidable since, as pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996), population is clearly
not a direct output of local production but is assumed to proxy for the various administrative
tasks undertaken by municipalities. The choice has also been driven by previous studies on
efficiency in other European local governments for which differences are basically confined to
the area of education—in Spain it is controlled by higher levels of government. An interesting
feature of our database is the inclusion of information on the quality of the infrastructures
and facilities. This is measured using an indicator taking the value of 1 (bad), 2 (fair) or 3
(good). We have constructed a weighted indicator of average quality, and it has been modeled
as an additional output (Y9).5
The choice of inputs is based on budget information, which reflects municipalities’ costs.
Three main categories are included: current (ordinary) expenditures, capital expenditures,
and financial expenditures. The first ones contain four further categories, which account
for: (i) personnel expenditure; (ii) current goods and services expenditures; (iii) financial
expenditures; (iv) current transfers. Capital expenditures are also decomposed, falling into
either real investments, or capital transfers. The former is what the economic budgetary
classification labels as capital expenditures, i.e., all expenditures local governments implement
either: (i) to produce or acquire capital goods; (ii) to acquire necessary goods to provide local
services in the right conditions; (iii) financial expenditures that are suitable for amortization.
Capital transfers refer to the payments to institutions to finance certain investments. Since
we measure overall cost efficiency, and all inputs refer to different costs’ categories, they have
been added to sum up the total cost figure, TC.6 Some summary statistics for both inputs
and outputs are reported in Table 1.
4. Results
The decentralization economies indicator should be interpreted as the gains that municipalities
obtain over time from focusing on a wider range of services and facilities. Summary results
are reported in Table 2, and they suggest that, over time—both from 1995 to 2000, and from
2000 to 2005—benefits are obtained from a broader range for municipalities with higher levels
5The literature has considered multiple ways to control for the quality of the outputs. See, for instance,
the early proposals by Banker and Morey (1986).
6See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for additional details on the inputs and budgetary classification.
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of powers, since most deciles of the decentralization economies index distribution present
values greater than unity. We provide information for different deciles of the distribution,
since it permits us to understand more accurately the magnitude of the decentralization
economies. Globally, these results show that, in relative terms, the temporal evolution of
decentralized (or devolved) municipalities improves on the cost frontier constructed with the
less decentralized municipalities. The effect is not entirely mimicked for the 2000–2005, when
the technical change effect still prevails yet to a lesser extent. However, the empirical evidence
is not enough to conclude whether a clear tendency exists. Recall that expression (4) breaks
down the decentralization economies index into two components: the technical change index
(movements of the cost frontier) and the efficiency change index (change in the distance
separating inefficiency units from their cost frontier).
Table 2 is a good example of the advantages of breaking down global indices, in order to
disentangle the extent to which there are basic phenomena probably masked by excessively
aggregated indices. Indeed, the technical change index exhibits average values greater than
unity, which indicates that the decentralized best performing municipalities have shifted their
respective cost frontier more than the less decentralized best performers. On the other hand,
as the efficiency change index is significantly smaller than unity, inefficient decentralized mu-
nicipalities have been unable to follow the pace of the innovators. Therefore, the innovations
introduced by decentralized municipalities have a remarkable impact on efficiency, but they
encounter a sort of barriers to mobility, which hinders the spreading of these innovations
among decentralized municipalities.
Overall, this is reflected in that the scope for improving the efficiency of decentralized mu-
nicipalities through innovations introduced by the most dynamic decentralized municipalities
grew from 1995 to 2000, and to a lesser extent from 2000 to 2005. Regarding the inefficient
units, once the barriers to mobility are overcome, they have a potential growth in efficiency
and emulate the innovations introduced by the most dynamic decentralized municipalities. In
sum, innovations producing shifts in the cost frontiers are far more important in decentral-
ized municipalities. The shifts in the frontier, however, are not mechanically translated to
the decentralization index because there seems to be a problem in the spread of innovations.
Once the problem of how to disseminate these good practices is solved, the advantage of
decentralized municipalities in dynamic terms would be unquestionable.
We now turn to an analysis of distribution dynamics of the decentralization indices, and
focus not only on summary statistics like those reported in Table 1, but on how the entire
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distributions have evolved. Figures 4 through 7 provide the means to assess to what extent
each of the two components of the decentralization economies index—technical change and
efficiency change—account for the deformation of its distribution between the selected sub-
periods and the entire 1995–2005 period. Figure 4.a displays kernel-based density estimates
(essentially “smoothed” histograms) of γs2/βs2 for years 1995 (t, solid line) and 2000 (t + 1,
dashed line). Figure 6.a reports analogous information for the 2000–2005 subperiod. Vertical
lines represent mean values for each distribution in each figure, i.e., solid line for the base
period, b, and dashed line for the current period, c. Both b and c differ for the different
figures. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 b = 1995 and c = 2000, whereas in Figure 6 and Figure 7,
b = 2000 and c = 2005. These vertical lines suggest that the advances have been modest and,
therefore, we can probably conclude that decentralization economies have not improved over
time on average. A more extended graphical analysis considering the entire distribution and
not only a summary statistic reveals that differences between both distributions are not very
important, and therefore we can probably conclude that decentralization economies have not
improved over time. This conclusion applies for the 2000–2005 transition (Figure 6.a and Fig-
ure 7.a). However, for the 1995–2000 period (Figure 4.a and Figure 5.a) differences between
both densities are peculiar, as we could conclude they are confined to being slightly tighter in
year 2000. The bandwidths for the different densities (obtained using the second-generation
plug-in method by Sheather and Jones (1991)) are reported in the different legends. Not all
the legends have bandwidths, since some of the figures are the same.7
However, decomposing the evolution of γs2/βs2 into its two components (technical change
and efficiency change) suggests the shift from γs2,1995/βs2,1995 to γs2,2000/βs2,2000 has been
generated by two opposite effects. Figure 4.b indicates that the factor contributing positively
to its advance has been a technical change component. The solid line represents the distrib-
ution in Equation (6), which isolates the effect on the distribution of changes in technology
only, as if no efficiency change occurred from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, the final (year 2000)
distribution would be represented by the solid line. Vertical lines indicate the mean values for
both distributions (γs2,1995/βs2,1995 and (γs2/βs2)TECH = tc× (γs2/βs2)1995, respectively) do
indeed differ substantially, as already reported in Table 1. What Table 1 does not indicate is
that, although the technical change index has increased to a large extent, dispersion has also
increased remarkably, as reflected by much more spread probability mass for (γs2/βs2)TECH
as compared with γs2,1995/βs2,1995. Finally, Figure 4.c displays the distribution of γs2/βs2 for
7Figures and bandwidths obtained by alternative methods are available upon request. Results only differed
slightly.
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year 2000 alone, i.e., transition from Figure 4.b to Figure 4.c reveals the effect of efficiency
change only. The patterns are very similar when evaluating the transitions from 2000 to 2005
(Figure 6.b), except for the existence of certain bimodality from 1995 to 2000 (Figure 4.b).
Therefore, the general trend—indicating that dispersion is much higher regarding technical
change—is corroborated. It is also important to realize the importance of evaluating these
trends not only via the usual summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) but rather
examining the shape of the densities. Their analysis is important because of their peculiarities,
showing that the effect of technical change leads to its flattening, especially in the vicinity of
the average.
Figure 5 and Figure 7 report similar information to that reported in Figure 4 and Figure
6, respectively. The main difference is contained in Figure 5.b and Figure 7.b, where the solid
lines indicate what the impact is on γs2/βs2 of efficiency change only, i.e., we isolate the effect
on the distribution of γs2/βs2 as if no technical change existed. As indicated by both the
mean (solid vertical line) and the deformation of the distribution, it is clearly detrimental, for
both 1995–2000 (Figure 5.b) and 2000–2005 (Figure 7.b) periods. The decline in the mean
value is lower than the mean increase reported in Figure 4.b and Figure 6.b, and insinuates
that a positive effect over time could prevail. However, as shown by Figure 4.a and 5.a, the
shapes of the distributions do not seem to differ a great deal.
The conclusions inferred from visually analyzing distributions can be reinforced via appli-
cation of the tests proposed in Section 2 (Li, 1996, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006). These
are reported in Table 3, which corroborate results in figures 4 through 7. The p-values ob-
tained when testing the null H0 : f [(γs2/βs2)b] = g[(γs2/βs2)c] indicates that the visual
differences found between distributions in the base (b) and current (c) periods are significant
in all instances. Therefore, the effects of technical change and efficiency change considered
individually lead to significant changes in the shape of the densities, since both of them are
statistically significant at the most stringent significance levels and for all comparisons (either
1995 vs. 2000, or 2000 vs. 2005).
5. Concluding remarks
In this article we analyze the links between devolution and efficiency of Spanish municipalities
from a dynamic perspective, considering the evolution for two periods, namely, from 1995
to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005. These are relevant years in which the Spanish economy
surged, and when some relevant initiatives for Spanish local governments took place. We
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construct a methodology based on the (deterministic) frontier production function literature
(Farrell, 1957; Afriat, 1972; Färe et al., 1994). Specifically, we derived an indicator à la
Malmquist (Caves et al., 1982) which allows us to measure whether efficiency gains from
enhanced decentralization of powers have increased over time. The indicator also decomposes
this time evolution in two components with specific economic meanings, in a similar fashion
to the Malmquist index which decomposes productivity change into efficiency change and
technical change.
We also consider a sequential decomposition of the decentralization economies indicator in
the spirit of Kumar and Russell (2002). This decomposition allows us to ascertain what the
most important component of the decentralization economies indicator is—either the technical
change or the catching up component. We consider that this methodology is important since
results might vary a great deal across local governments, and applying this approach generates
results which are not based on central moments of the distribution only. In particular, results
show that the effect of technical change varies a great deal across municipalities, whereas
catching up is more homogeneous.
The application to Spanish local governments is relevant for several reasons, among which
we may highlight the debate on the hypothetical benefits attainable from a second decentral-
ization (that consists of transferring powers not only from national to regional but also from
regional to the lowest level of government, i.e., municipalities), and the response of munici-
palities to the new regulatory environment emerging after passing the law on the balanced
budget, which is related to the European Stability and Growth Pact. Some recent trends
in the economy such as the crisis of the construction sector make it even more relevant to
analyze the Spanish case, where powers related to urbanism are in hands of municipalities.
Results show that, over time, benefits for larger municipalities (with more powers) are
increasing, due to the relatively higher magnitude of the technical change compared to the
efficiency change index. However, differences are remarkable across municipalities—some of
them perform very well, others trail behind. Decentralization economies, which are the result
of the combined effect of technical change and efficiency change, have not improved on aver-
age, and this result is robust to the period under analysis—either 1995–2000 or 2000–2005.
In contrast, efficiency change is lower, but differences among municipalities are less stringent,
contributing positively to reduce discrepancies among municipalities in the decentralization
index. These findings could be related to the trend experienced in most public sector areas
before Spain’s economy joined the Euro, which followed the stipulations of the Maastricht
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Treaty on the sustainability of the government’s financial position. The commitments of
Maastricht brought about a policy of deficit control, boosting the demand for more efficient
government and public administration, and a “White paper on the improvement of public
services. A new administration at the service of citizens” was released in 1999. These were
initiatives to reform public administration, introducing many of the specific changes in man-
agement practice, included in the New Public Management (NPM) (Pollitt, 2002) recipe, but
without being able to set off systemic changes. Thus, although Spain has implemented many
of the ingredients of the NPM, there are still few visible benefits. Our findings, indicating
that remarkable differences exist between municipalities, corroborate these claims. They also
confirm that trends differ for the two sample periods considered, although only slightly.
In line with the implications pointed out by Worthington and Dollery (2000), our results
show technical progress together with negative efficiency change. This means that specific
decentralized municipalities (those that operate efficiently) might be innovating and taking
advantage of their new management practices. However, during the period we analyze the
spread of innovations does not occur at the same pace (this duality is more evident in the
period 1995–2000 than in 2000–2005). The improvement in the level of decentralized munici-
palities’ efficiency will therefore depend more on the spread of existing innovations to inefficient
municipalities—a kind of contagion from the innovators to the inefficient followers—than in
the generation of additional ones. This process can be reinforced by disseminating among
local governments those reforms that were introduced and have shown positive results.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for inputs and outputs, year
2005)
Inputs Median Std.Dev.
Total costsa,b (TC) 669.999 441.280
Outputs
Population (Y1) 3,290.500 8,935.361
Number of lighting pointsb (Y2) 0.233 1.355
Tones of waste collectedc (Y3) 0.467 34.985
Street infrastructure surface areab,c (Y4) 51.966 41.255
Public buildings surface areab,c (Y5) 0.028 1.784
Market surface areab,c (Y6) 0.002 3.077
Registered area of public parksb,c (Y7) 3.373 204.229
Assistance centers surface area b,c (Y8) 0.170 0.766
Quality (Y9) 2.283 0.315
# of observations 1,164
a In thousands of 1995 pesetas (1 euro=166.386 pesetas).
b Divided by population.
c In square metres.
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Table 2: Percentage change of bipartite decomposition indexes, selected deciles
Index 10% decile 30% decile 50% decile 70% decile 90% decile
(median)
1995–2000
Change in decentralization economies 52.05 76.92 96.03 124.10 228.77
Technical change 77.71 107.08 142.20 186.23 311.24
Efficiency change 29.73 52.78 70.11 93.01 153.80
2000–2005
Change in decentralization economies 34.49 71.59 89.51 113.07 162.87
Technical change 48.65 86.07 112.98 153.77 270.30
Efficiency change 39.25 60.95 80.76 100 128.18
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Table 3: Distribution hypothesis tests, 1995 vs. 2000 vs. 2005 (Li, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006)
Null hypothesis (H0)
T -test
statistics
p-value
One-percent
significance level
1995 vs. 2000
f [(γs2/βs2 )1995] = g[(γs2/βs2)2000] 3.827 0.002 H0 rejected
f [(γs2/βs2 )1995] = gTECH [tc× (γs2/βs2)1995] = g[(γs2/βs2)TECH ] 6.854 0.000 H0 rejected
f [(γs2/βs2 )1995] = gEFF [ec× (γs2/βs2)1995] = g[(γs2/βs2)EFF ] 20.488 0.000 H0 rejected
2000 vs. 2005
f [(γs2/βs2 )2000] = g[(γs2/βs2)2005] 5.717 0.000 H0 rejected
f [(γs2/βs2 )2000] = gTECH [tc× (γs2/βs2)2000] = g[(γs2/βs2)TECH ] 20.178 0.000 H0 rejected
f [(γs2/βs2 )2000] = gEFF [ec× (γs2/βs2)2000] = g[(γs2/βs2)EFF ] 14.700 0.000 H0 rejected
Notes: The functions f(·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for the actual decentralization economies
index in the current and base period, respectively; gTECH(·) and gEFF (·) are counterfactual distributions obtained
by adjusting the 1995 distribution of (γs2/βs2) for the effects of advances in technology (tc) and advances in
efficiency (ec), respectively.
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Figure 1: DEA vs. FDH frontier
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Figure 2: Scenario 1. Decentralized municipalities more efficient than centralized munici-
palities
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Figure 3: Scenario 2. Centralized municipalities more efficient than decentralized munici-
palities
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